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University of West Georgia
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INTRODUCTION
The following paper attempts to determine motivations behind terrorism
from the perspectives of Rational Choice Theory and Social Solidarity Theory. It
explains  difficulties  in  agreeing  on  a  common  definition  of  terrorism  among
different scholars and reviews some of the possible demographic, psychological
and social dynamic causes of terrorism, ultimately concluding that understanding
motivation  for  terrorist  acts  cannot  be  determined  uni-dimensionally  and  that
different  levels  of  terrorist  organizations  are  best  understood  using  different
theories. Individual suicide bombers’ motivations can be best explained by Social
Solidarity Theory, while sponsoring organizations’ motives are best explained by
Rational Choice Theory. 
According to Olivier Roy (2006), the original al-Qaida members were of
predominantly  Saudi  Arabian  and  Egyptian  origin.  Thus,  these  countries  are
significantly  represented  in  the  paper,  to  the  extent  that  the  example  of
mechanical  solidarity  included  below is  based  on  Saudi  Arabian  history.  The
paper  examines  suicide  terrorism,  although  it  also  explores  other  forms  of
terrorism. Although this paper examines a pre-Islamic State era of terrorism, some
journalists report that the boundaries of the IS “caliphate” are diminishing and
requiring  it  to  u-turn  into  an insurgency and competitor  to  al-Qaida  (Marcus,
2017).  Thus,  these  perspectives  still  contribute  to  the  understanding  of  the
motivations for past and contemporary terrorism.
SUICIDE TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY
In  reviewing  the  literature  concerning  terrorism  and  Rational  Choice
Theory,  one  finds  that  rational  choice  is  much more  accepted  in  the  political
science  than  sociological  discipline,  perhaps  due  in  part  to  RCT’s  origin  in
economic theory. Early classical theorists outlined sociology by differentiating it
from  economic  theory.  Currently,  some  theorists  are  still  resistant  to  the
“colonization”  of  sociology by RCT (which  they  call  exchange theory  [Scott,
2000]), although this may be slowly changing (Hedström & Stern, 2008). 
Since  an  individual  characterized  by  one  person  as  a  terrorist  will  be
characterized  by  another  as  a  freedom  fighter  (Bates,  2011;  Qirko,  2009;
Shughart, 2011), martyr, revolutionary, insurgent, or common criminal (Shughart,
2011), no definition is unanimously recognized (Atran, 2003; Karoui, 2010; Post,
et  al,  2009).  However,  definitions  provided  by  many  scholars  (Atran,  2003;
Karoui, 2010; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Pape, 2005; Post, et al, 2009) closely echoed
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the Office of the Coordinator, US Department of State definition of terrorism as
“premeditated,  politically  motivated violence perpetrated against  noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence
an  audience”  (Shughart,  2011,  p.127).  As  seen  below,  the  theories  that  these
theorists provide support this definition with the exception that most imply the
attempt to influence multiple audiences instead of just one audience. 
In  Rational  Choice  Theory,  individuals  are  seen  to  be  active,  rational
agents that determine the best course of action given certain rewards and costs.
Many theorists believe that terrorism can be explained through the lens of RCT.
Shughart believes that terrorists calculate risks and make choices in order to gain
the greatest benefit for the least cost in “money, munitions and manpower” (2011,
p.127). They also shift tactics when states enact countermeasures against them.
Atran (2003) states that the cost of outfitting a Palestinian suicide bomber is $150,
of which transportation to the site is the most expensive item. This cost gains the
sponsor  organization  increased  public  support  and  more  prospective  bombers.
Bryan  Caplan  (2006)  counters  this  assertion,  also  citing  Rational  Choice.  He
believes that the sponsoring organizations have a large motivation to overstate
their  influence and willingness to  utilize suicide terrorism.  and questions  why
there are not more bombings given the claims of plentiful recruits and money to
outfit them. Caplan cites the example of two terrorist organizations engaged in a
morbid  rivalry  in  which  they  tried  to  outdo  each  other  in  the  number  and
destructiveness of suicide bombings yet completed only five effective attacks per
month. Caplan classifies terrorists into three categories: sympathizers (approve of
but do not enact terrorism), active terrorists (actual members of an organization),
and  suicidal  terrorists  (who  actually  self-murder  for  their  belief).  While  he
believes that there are many free riders that gain benefits without incurring cost in
this scenario, he points out that suicide bombing claims 4 to 13 times as many
lives as traditional terrorism and is thus a more effective and destructive form of
terrorism.
But what is the ultimate aim of terrorists? Kydd and Walter (2006) believe
that terrorism amounts to a costly form of signaling to two crucial audiences–
foreign states that they wish to sway and members of their own community that
they wish to gain backing from or whom they wish to dominate. According to
Kydd and Walter, this signaling serves five purposes: attrition (to persuade the
enemy that they will outlast them), intimidation (persuade their population that
they can dominate them without fear of reprisal by the government), provocation
(to incite the enemy to respond violently, which radicalizes the population and
convinces them to support the terrorists), spoiling (undermine any group that tries
to make peace with the enemy), and outbidding (convince their population that
they are best able to battle the enemy rather than alternative groups). Post, et al
(2009) cite Alex Schmid’s  Political Terrorism (1983) in which he differentiates
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between the target of violence and of attention. He subdivides targets of attention
into 3 groups: 1) the target of terror, same as target of violence; 2) the target of
coercion,  that  group directly  threatened by the  terrorists;  and 3)  the  target  of
influence, Western countries or other groups that are the ultimate audience of the
act. Schmid also states that terrorism is symbolic, since it aims to challenge a state
or other power that it is unable to overthrow.
  Robert  Pape believes that “terrorism has two broad purposes: to gain
supporters and to coerce opponents” (2005, p.8). He separates it into 3 categories.
The main purposes of acts of “Demonstrative Terrorism” are to gain publicity for
recruitment  purposes,  to  draw attention of moderates  in the opposition and to
draw  attention  of  third  parties  that  might  serve  to  influence  the  opposition.
Examples  of  this  category  are  hijacking and hostage  taking.  The  purposes  of
“Destructive Terrorism” are coercion and possible gain of support, although this
can backfire due to the increased devastation of the acts. The most violent and
risky form is “Suicide Terrorism.” In this category, coercion is attempted even at
the risk of increased backlash from the opposition or loss of any possibility of
sympathy from neutral parties. The attacker does not expect to survive the act.
Pape states that this is not a new phenomenon, although previously attacks were
more suicide missions than suicide terrorism. He details  attacks by the Jewish
Zealots in the first-century AD (see also: Atran, 2003; Stack, 2004), the Shi’ite
sect of Ismaili Assassins (hashashins, see also: Atran, 2003) in the eleventh-and
twelfth-century,  and  the  Japanese  Kamikazes  of  World  War  II.  Like  suicide
attackers, the young, educated kamikazes (“divine wind”) volunteered for the task
when they realized that orthodox combat would end in conquest (Atran, 2003;
Bloom, 2005). Unlike suicide terrorists, kamikazes only attacked military targets
and were driven to sacrifice for their country (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017).
Kamikazes were one of the reasons that Americans supported use of the atomic
bomb  (Atran,  2003).  Qirko  (2009)  points  out  that  kamikazes  were  deeply
influenced by Bushido, the Samurai code of ethical regulation based on Japanese
Shinto belief (Hexham, 1993).
While  Bushido  may  help  to  explain  the  motivation  of  kamikazes,  the
motivation of suicide terrorists is less clear. Qirko does not believe that suicide
attackers  will  only  be  understood  by  “scrutinizing  their  spiritual-intellectual
world, the ideologies that have molded them, and the myths they grew up in”
(2009, p.292). Efficacy and ideology are two competing frameworks proposed by
some researchers (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017). In contrast to an  ideological
framework,  Pape  (2005)  believes  that  religion,  while  serving  as  an  effective
recruitment tool, is not the ultimate motivation. He points out that suicide attacks
by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group of Hindu descent with
members that are steadfastly anti-religion, make up almost twenty-five percent of
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the  suicide  attacks  between  1980  and  2003.  Qirko  (2009)  states  that  the
percentage of secular attacks was half.
In  terms of  demographic  information,  Moaddel  and  Karabenick (2008)
surveyed citizens of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to determine their level of religious
fundamentalism  in  relation  to  other  variables.  They  found  it  to  be  high  for
respondents that relied on religious authorities for religious information, Islamic
orthodoxy,  fatalistic  attitudes  and feelings  of  insecurity,  while  being  inversely
related  to  television  viewership  frequency.  While  Moaddel  and  Karabenick
expected university  education  would  contribute  to  openness  of  mind  toward
members  of  other  faiths,  they  found  that  religious  fundamentalism  was  not
affected significantly by university education (2008).
Momayezi  and Momayezi  (2017) have pointed out  that  many analyses
have focused on poverty, lack of education, and mental illness, but Pape states
that suicide attackers are  not “poor,  uneducated,  immature religious  zealots  or
social losers” (2005, p.216). They are usually well educated, socially integrated
individuals from both religious and secular backgrounds (see also: Atran, 2003;
Karoui, 2010; Khalid & Olsson, 2006; Post, et al, 2009; Qirko, 2009; Sutton &
Vertigans, 2005).
Standard  psychological  theories  of  suicide  seem to  lack  as  well.  Pape
(2005) states that what he calls psychological autopsy–analyzing the background,
psychological well-being and suicide-proneness of attackers after the fact–tends
to yield little.  Qirko (2009) cites an Islamic Jihad member as saying that any
person that shows a tendency toward suicide is not allowed to become a martyr.
He also points out the lack of explanation in Social Learning Theory as to why
terror organization members from communities not favorable to martyrdom carry
out suicide attacks and those from pro-martyrdom communities may not. Indeed,
Qirko (2009) does not believe that any psychological or social dynamic explains
the cause and that it is merely a politico-strategic choice of a group.
Pape  (2005)  believes  that  a  three-step  process  can  explain  suicide
terrorism--examining the strategic logic of terrorism, the social logic of suicide
terrorism and the individual logic of suicide terrorism. While many scholars have
questioned  Pape’s  assumptions  of  strategic  logic,  his  questions  of  social  and
individual logic of suicide terrorism link to Durkheim’s work on Social Solidarity
and suicide, covered below (1893; 1897). 
What is the strategic logic of terrorism?
Characteristic of the efficacy framework (Momayezi & Momayezi, 2017),
Pape’s (2005) strategic logic of terrorism posits that if the group did not believe
that terrorism satisfied its agenda, they would not carry it out. He believes that the
organization’s  agenda  can  be  explained  as  a  terrorist  response  to  foreign
occupation by modern democracies and as an attempt to coerce these democracies
to withdraw forces from what terrorists consider their homeland. However, in a
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paper  presented  at  the  “A  Culture  of  Death:  On  Root  Causes  of  Suicide
Terrorism” conference in May of 2005, Bloom states that Pape’s model glosses
over  local  partisan  undercurrents.  She  believes  that  there  are  multiple  and
sometimes-conflicting objectives of suicide attack, including against an occupier,
against alternative groups (outbidding), and against any other group that tries to
make peace with the enemy (spoiling) (2005). 
It could be argued that Pape’s emphasis here is his category of “Suicide
Terrorism” and that  his  other  categories  of  “Demonstrative”  and  “Destructive
Terrorism” are better able to explain domestic concerns of terrorist organization.
Bloom (2005) also believes that Pape’s model doesn’t take into account religious
and other  groups concerned with  more  than  territory  and their  use  of  suicide
attacks.  She  states  that  his  focus  on  democracies  cannot  be  confirmed  since
authoritarian governments don’t  allow opposition groups that would engage in
suicide attacks, citing the example of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rally against the
Syrian  Ba’athist  regime  and  the  government’s  elimination  of  them  and  their
supporters.  Bloom also  questions  Pape’s  characterization  of  1980s  Sri  Lanka,
Israel in the Occupied Territories and Russians in Chechnya as democratic.
Pape (2005) also applies his strategic logic of terrorism model to Osama
bin Laden and al-Qaida. Although American troops were not occupiers in Saudi
Arabia,  bin  Laden  wanted  them  withdrawn  and  wanted  an  end  to  American
influence in the region. Two years after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, US
troops  left  Saudi  Arabia  for  Iraq  (Kydd & Walter,  2006).  However,  al-Qaida
stated that the US will continue to be a target until all troops are withdrawn from
the  Persian  Gulf  region  and  the  US  discontinues  its  backing  of  Israel  and
governments such as the Saudi Royal Family and (at the time) Pervez Musharraf
in Pakistan (Abrahms, 2006).
Over the last few decades, according to Pape (2005), organizations have
learned the value of terrorism in convincing American and French military forces
to withdraw from Lebanon in 1983; in convincing Israeli forces to leave Lebanon
in 1985; and in convincing Israeli forces to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank in 1994 and 1995. He believes that after beginning suicide terrorism,
these  organizations  made more  gains  in  these  instances  than  they  had before.
However, Abrahms (2006) conducted a study with findings that ran counter to
Pape’s. In the study, Abrahms investigated the success of groups labeled by the
U.S. Department of State as terrorists, and thus avoiding criticism such as that
levelled at Pape for effectively biasing his study toward terrorist triumphs and
falsely raising the success rate of terrorists  (see also: Ashworth,  2008; 2008b;
Pape,  2008).  Abrahms (2006) found that Pape’s study focused on only eleven
terrorist campaigns, ten of which targeted the same three countries– Israel, Sri
Lanka,  and  Turkey  (six  against  Israel  alone).  Also,  Pape  does  not  focus  on
whether the campaigns accomplished their principal goals. He considers the 1994
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limited withdrawals of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and West Bank as two
distinct terrorist successes, during which time there was a 167% increase in Israeli
settlers. Abrahms believes that Pape’s study therefore finds that terrorist groups
sometimes achieved strategic successes, not that terrorism is an effective policy.
Pape  (2005)  states  that  terrorist  organizations  recognize  that  they  are
smaller  and  weaker  than  Western  forces.  They  must  make  their  trainees  as
effective and efficient  as  possible  (Qirko,  2009).  In short,  barring access  to a
nuclear weapon, suicide bombing is the most reliable and deadly method available
to them (Pape, 2005).
What is the social logic of suicide terrorism? Terrorist organizations could
not continue without support from the community from which they recruit. As
long as they are seen as pursuing the legitimate goal of liberating the community
from foreign occupation, they receive broad support from it (Pape, 2005).
What is the individual logic of suicide terrorism? Pape (2005) believes
that most suicide attackers fit the profile for altruistic suicide as developed by
Emile Durkheim–that their extreme level of social integration and deference to
community values lead them to commit suicide from a sense of duty instead of
seeing the act as murder.
SUICIDE  TERRORISM  FROM  THE  PERSPECTIVE  OF  SOCIAL
SOLIDARITY THEORY
At the time that Emile Durkheim was writing The Division of Labour in
Society (1893) and Suicide (1897), France was transitioning from an agricultural,
male-controlled Catholic society to a modern,  industrial  nation.  This shift  was
opposed by religious and military hierarchy and the landed aristocracy. In contrast
with  these  groups,  Durkheim  favored  the  individualism,  secularism  and  free
market  belief  characteristic  of  modernity–within  reason.  He  believed
individualism should be rooted in social institutions and ethical focus (Seidman,
2008). Similar to the French transition from agrarian to modern, Saudi Arabia’s
transition  from a  tribal  land  resistant  to  Ottoman  rule  to  the  oil-rich,  Sa’udi-
Wahhabi Empire of today has been one of conflict.
Durkheim’s theory of Social Solidarity postulates that there are two types
of society–that of mechanical solidarity and that of organic solidarity. Mechanical
solidarity involves a segmental society of self-sufficient clan-bases (Durkheim,
2013). These clan-bases are traditional and conservative, with a unified religious
culture. Any behavior considered deviant is dealt with harshly as it poses a threat
to  social  unity.  Societies  with  organic  solidarity  are  specialized;  different
institutions maintain different expertise and understanding. These institutions are
thus interdependent. Cultural pluralism is prevalent and the law is concerned more
with contracts and advocates ideals of restitution as opposed to the punitive type
of  punishment  characteristic  of  mechanical  society.  In  effect,  the  scope  of
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common knowledge and common culture lessens until the only common belief is
that of individualism, becoming society’s public religion (Seidman, 2008).
Looking at the beginnings of the Saudi royal family, one can see a good
example  of  a  mechanical  society.  According  to  Al-Rasheed  (2010),  in  1727,
Muhammad ibn Sa’ud was Amir of Dir'iyyah, a village of less than 70 households
in  Najd.  The  al-Sa’ud  were  sedentary,  landholding  merchants.  As  such,
Muhammad ibn Sa’ud lacked tribal  affiliation or excess capital  with which to
expand his influence over territory or trading routes. This changed when al-Sa’ud
met Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and embraced Wahhabism in 1744. Abd al-
Wahhab  had  been  expelled  by  another  nearby  Amir  for  engaging  in  punitive
punishment, publicly stoning a woman accused of fornication. Abd al-Wahhab
espoused  a  pure  form  of  traditional  Islamic  monotheism,  including  a  strict
interpretation of  shari’a law that would not allow deviancy to pose a threat to
social unity. He needed a political partner with whom to further this vision. Abd
al-Wahhab advocated zakat, a religious tax given to the needy but, in effect, tax to
the ruler. In return, Muhammad ibn Sa’ud would be obliged to wage jihad against
those that  did not  follow the traditional,  conservative doctrines of this  unified
religious culture. This commitment to rid Arabia of heretical religion served as
reason for  expansion  by conquest,  resulting  ultimately  in  the  nation  of  Saudi
Arabia with state religion of Wahabbism (2010). 
Some posit that this type of society with a pure form of traditional Islamic
monotheism  and  a  strict  interpretation  of  shari’a law  that  would  not  allow
deviancy to pose a threat to social unity is the society that al-Qaida, the Taliban
and  other  Salafist  groups  would  like  to  return  to,  although  some sociologists
disagree  (Van  Biema  &  Crumley,  2003).  It  is  interesting  to  note  that,  in
attempting to achieve a return to mechanical solidarity, groups like al-Qaida have
succeeded in  building  organizations  that  best  represent  organic  solidarity.  Al-
Qaida  is  multi-national,  with  different  interdependent  divisions  for  financing,
strategic planning, training, carrying out attacks, etc.
Continuing  with  his  work  on  Social  Solidarity  Theory,  Durkheim
published Suicide in 1897. In it, he proposed two continuums that offered insight
into suicide. The first continuum (social integration) has egoistic suicide on one
end and altruistic suicide on the other. Social integration is the level of connection
between the person and society.  The second continuum (social  regulation) has
anomic suicide on one end and fatalistic suicide on the other. Social regulation
indicates the person’s social  wants and how they interact  with the norms and
boundaries imposed by society.
Egoistic suicide is a lack of social integration. Lacking social goals, the
person  loses  purpose  and  meaning  and  becomes  self-absorbed  and  isolated
(Seidman, 2008; Sutton & Vertigans, 2005). It is marked by high individualism.
Durkheim  found  that  Protestants  had  higher  suicide  rates  than  Catholics  and
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believed  that  this  was  due  to  the  individualistic  nature  of  Protestantism,  as
opposed to the social  integration of Catholicism (Seidman, 2008). This is also
characteristic of “egoistic lone wolf terrorists” that identify “with an agenda, but
not an organization” (Bates, 2011, p. 7).
In contrast, altruistic suicide can be seen as an excess of social integration,
to the point of conformity. A person’s individuality becomes secondary to the
needs, interests, and identity of a group. The individual becomes so enmeshed
with the group that threats to it can lead to suicide. Durkheim cites the example of
the  soldier  that  dies  to  save  his  brothers-in-arms  (Seidman,  2008;  Sutton  &
Vertigans,  2005).  Bates  cites  suicide  terrorists  from Al  Qaeda  and  Hamas  as
examples of “altruistic suicide terrorists” (2011, p. 7). Durkheim further divides
altruistic  suicide  into  obligatory,  optional  and  acute  altruistic  suicide.  In  the
obligatory type, the suicide is seen as a cultural norm and the person’s duty, often
to having been shamed. Stack (2004) states that failure to suicide can often lead to
punishment by the group. In the optional category, suicide is not seen as a duty
but as an option communicated to the individual, often from an early age. The
individuals sometimes achieve high status in the group as a result of their death.
In  the  acute  altruistic  category,  suicide  is  “purely  for  the  joy  of  sacrifice”
(Durkheim, 1951, p.223). Durkheim gives the example of Christian martyrs. This
best characterizes most suicide bombers that have lost themselves and choose to
suicide for their  group and a  higher power (Sutton & Vertigans,  2005).  Stack
(2004) states that altruistic suicide has four significant characteristics:  extreme
social integration, much public support (from the group), a profit to the group
materially or culturally, and is characterized by tremendous positive emotion.
In terms of the social regulation continuum, in anomic suicide the person
needs  social  and  moral  direction.  Durkheim  believed  people  structured  their
needs,  wishes  and goals  in  reference  to  society.  Lack of  stability,  such  as  in
economic crises (or economic booms), keeps them from being able to do this in a
consistent way. Security forces in the West are concerned about second and third
generation individuals from previous migrations/diasporas that find it difficult to
integrate into a new culture and feel stateless. Although not previously devout,
their  anomie and search for  stability  leads  them to extremist  mosques  or  into
contact  with  charismatic  clerics  (Post,  et  al,  2009)  and they  become “anomic
insurgent terrorists” (Bates, 2011, p. 6). This is also found to be a problem for
new  immigrants  or  foreign  students  studying  in  the  West  (Khalid  &  Olsson,
2006).
Opposite anomic suicide on the social regulation continuum is fatalistic
suicide in which the social rules and norms are so intrusive and confining the
individual can’t envision progress. This category was undeveloped by Durkheim.
He cites the example of slaves. This category can be seen to characterize some
suicide attackers, particularly those of Palestine in response to Israeli occupation.
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Another  example  of  “fatalistic  suicide  terrorists”  is  Chechen  female  suicide
bombers (“Black Widows”) (Bates, 2011, p. 7). The desperation can be found in a
quote by the mother of the second intifada's first female martyr, Wafa Idris, “She
was young, intelligent,  and beautiful,  and had nothing to  live for” (Sutton,  &
Vertigans, 2005, p.69) and in a quote by an elderly Jenin woman to a reporter,
“Look how we live here.  Then maybe you'll  understand why there are always
volunteers for martyrdom. Every good Muslim understands that it's better to die
fighting than to live without hope” (Post, et al, 2009, p.19).
As has been seen in this section, individual terrorists’ motivations are best
explained by Social Solidarity Theory. Terrorist acts such as those by Palestinians
against Israel can best be explained by Emile Durkheim’s concept of Fatalistic
suicide, while Anomic suicide best explains terrorist acts by second generation
and  student  immigrants  and  Altruistic  suicide  best  characterizes  most  suicide
bombers.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In  considering  the  perspectives  of  Rational  Choice  Theory  and  Social
Solidarity Theory to try to determine motivations behind suicide terrorism, it has
been  found  that  both  appear  to  help  one  gain  insight  into  the  phenomenon.
Individual suicide bombers’ motivations can be explained by Durkheim’s suicide
types, while sponsoring organizations’ motives are more political, and thus best
viewed as rational choice. An explanation for this is suggested by Bloom (2005)
and Kydd and Walter (2006), who state that the individual must be considered
separately  from the  organization.  However, individuals  and  organizations  can
both be seen as acting rationally as their actions can be seen as consistent with
choosing options most likely to realize their objectives (Bloom, 2005). This seems
confusing  at  first.  However,  an  element  of  Rational  Choice  Theory  is
methodological individualism, where: “The elementary unit of social life is the
individual human action.  To explain social institutions and social change is to
show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals”
(Scott, 2000, p.127). Thus one sees elements of this theory when looking at the
individual and the organization. 
Therefore,  in  viewing  societies  as  whole,  speaking  of  mechanical  and
organic  solidarity  is  useful,  especially  in  explaining  what  type  of  society  is
preferred and which one is denounced by terrorists. In examining the sponsoring
organizations, Rational Choice Theory is most useful, although one will see this at
work at the individual level as well.
In searching for the motives of the suicide attackers themselves, the more
useful  tactic  is  to  look  at  individual  responses  to  different  levels  of  social
integration  and  social  regulation  and  the  categories  of  altruistic,  anomic  and
fatalistic  suicide.  Emile  Durkheim’s  acute  altruistic  suicide  best  characterizes
most  suicide bombers that have lost  themselves  and choose to  suicide for the
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group.  His  category  of  anomic  suicide  explains  second  and  third  generation
individuals  from  previous  migrations/diasporas  whose  anomie  leads  them  to
extremist  mosques  where  they  become  radicalized,  homegrown terrorists.  His
category  of  fatalistic  suicide  in  which  social  norms  are  so  invasive  that  the
individual  can’t  imagine  improvement  best  characterizes  Palestinian  suicide
attackers responding to Israeli occupation.
It is possible that motivation for suicide attackers is an example of “the
end justifies the means” and thus could best be explained by Robert Merton’s
(1938) study of the lack of coordination between means and end processes. A
disproportionate  emphasis  on  culture  goals  and  product  could  exert  pressure
resulting  in  nonconformist  behavior  limited  only  by  technical  rather  than
institutional  norms  and  process.  However,  the  question  still  becomes  which
culture is utilized to define the “aspirations and socially structured means” (1938,
p. 674) whereby the terrorist countermores are generated and would that culture
be considered a mechanical or organic society? Would this be an example of a
mechanical  society  engaging in  “rebellious  conduct  … to  refashion the  social
framework”  (1938,  p.  682)  of  a  more  organic  society?  This  is  an  interesting
question that should be addressed in future research.
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